In their view, out-groups use sinister conspirators as pawns to influence their religious group members Fealy, ; Kohut et al. As a result, blaming others e. In contrast, more moderate members of a religion often attribute the root causes of in-group problems to internal factors such as anti-intellectual biases, geopolitical instability, and corruption Lackey, Moderate groups also place greater emphasis on the need to change to address modern concerns.
Consequently, more moderate groups tend to be more open to collaboration in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue whereas more extreme religious groups emphasize rejection and avoidance.
Interfaith dialogue is often developed by more moderate religious activists to strengthen inter-religious cooperation as a way to solve common problems e. However, more extreme religious groups often actively reject this collaborative effort, as they perceive inter-religious dialogue as part of a conspiracy to weaken the faith in their religion. Turning to intragroup relations with other members of the faith community: religion serves as an organizing set of key values that are captured and expressed in group norms.
In the context of social relationships, such group norms may vary in the extent to which they tolerate difference and dissent within the religious group. At times, harsh attitudes toward dissenters and deviants may prevail when universal values of tolerance and group-specific values clash and individuals are forced to follow group-specific values.
For instance, because Islam forbids liquors, some Muslims would like to force the government to ban the trade in alcohol, without considering that other groups of people have different norms permitting alcohol consumption Osman, a. In the context of Indonesia, an active group called the Islamic Defenders Front FPI is one of many aiming to force the entire nation to follow one version of Islamic social norms Arifianto, Hence, the social dimension of religious extremism in our approach is indicated in Indonesia by patterns of externally attributing the causes of in-group disadvantages, and forcing out-groups as well as all in-group members to follow narrow, prescriptive social norms.
Naturally, social and political dimensions of religion will often be inter-related, especially where groups seek political power to impose their socially extreme viewpoint. However, in distinguishing the two dimensions, we highlight that some groups will be socially extreme without endorsing extreme political views or seeking political power.
Groups who expel internal heretics and who shun contact with infidels without trying to dominate them may fall into this category, in our model. As mentioned, the discourse of religious extremism has mostly been related to the political context Fealy, ; Zarkasyi, In an attempt to understand different forms of extremism more comprehensively, we compared these groups on the other three dimensions. Before outlining our findings, it is important to note that the classification of a particular group as politically extreme was based on specific historical events and developments: by acts of political rebellion by Darul Islam Domain of Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia Indonesian Islamic State in This was also the basis for selecting as extreme the current political movement Hizbut Tahrir and Islamic defender front FPI who have gained support after the reform of Fealy, ; Muhtadi, ; Osman, a.
All groups score high in extremism on the political dimensions in that they demand a comprehensive legalization of sharia , a fully Islamic state, recreation of Caliphate, and the abolition of democracy in Indonesia. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front FPI supports a comprehensive legalization of sharia, but endorses democracy and rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate Fealy, Another group Laskar Jihad or Jihad Troops demands comprehensive sharia and rejects democracy, but also rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate.
Both these commonalities and differences have consequences for their relationship with other religious groups and the way they aim to achieve their goals. While we acknowledge the importance of unpacking the political dimension into constituent elements in some cases, our argument is that to fully understand these groups, we also need to explore where these groups stand on the other three dimensions of religious extremism i.
In terms of extremism in the theological dimension, notions about an angry God who uses natural disasters punitively are particularly important to tease the different extremist groups apart. For instance, some Muslim groups in Indonesia claim that ritual celebration of the local tradition in Palu in Central Sulawesi is a main cause of the earthquake and tsunami that hit the Indonesian coast in , killing more than people.
Likewise, such attributions also dominated when explaining the earthquake in Lombok Island Habdan and Baits, These groups emphasized that the earthquake is a punishment from God to show disapproval of the politically different attitudes that are promoted by the political leader of the Island Hasan, Interestingly, such theological beliefs do not lead to a push for change of the political system, but only to an invitation to return to Islamic norms as they understand them.
This shows that an extreme theological belief may not be correlated with extremism on the political dimension. However, extremism in the theological dimension may also be related to a narrow interpretation of jihad as a core principle in Islam. Most Muslim groups believe that jihad means any zealous effort to bring about a better world Esposito, Theological beliefs restricting the meaning of jihad to waging holy war have an impact on political extremism, in that these can drive believers into intentions to verbally or physically attack the hated out-groups to engage in jihad.
Finally, some groups that are located at the extreme end of the ritual dimension are actively campaigning to purify religious rituals and to suppress local traditions that are perceived as deviating from Islam. For example, some groups such as the Salafi movement and al Wahdah al Islamiyah in Indonesia campaign against local traditions and push for the Muslims to relinquish traditions that are perceived as not taught by the prophet Salman, Importantly though, these movements do not use physical violence in their efforts, and they accept and participate in the political system in Indonesia.
Thus, although these groups tend to be extreme on the ritual dimension, they are more moderate on other dimensions. For example, they have a broader conception of jihad i. Even though such social extremism often involves intolerance of norm violations, social extremism is not always followed by extremism on other dimensions e.
In particular, social extremism in Indonesia is rarely linked to terror campaigns. The different ways in which religious groups express their religious identity on the theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions affect not only the ways they aim to achieve their goals but also the ways they relate to other religious groups.
Using social identity theory as a lens to conceptualize intergroup relations Turner and Oakes, , we propose that the nature of intergroup relations between moderate and extreme religious groups is determined by the perceived degree of similarity on the four dimensions. As an illustration, two groups or more can cooperate with each other in their collective action when they perceive shared values and a larger identity, while breaking into conflict when internal differences are salient.
For example, in Indonesia, when the former governor of Jakarta Basuki Tjahaya Purnama aka Ahok was eventually indicted on charges of insulting a section of the Quran, many Muslim groups were united in their efforts to demand punishment of him. A series of mass protests against the perceived blasphemy were attended by hundreds of thousands of people across the country Fealy, From an identity perspective, it can be argued that the shared outrage about the former governor who was perceived to have insulted Islam brought different Muslim groups together, and different groups worked together to address the common grievances and the common threats to the superordinate Muslim identity.
Despite this example of unity, it is also clear that there are many instances when relationships between moderate as well as more extreme religious groups are more tense. We argue that these tensions can also be better understood by taking account of the way in which moderate vs. For example, members of The Prosperous Justice Party PKS and members of Hizbut Tahrir largely take the same stance on the social dimension in that both groups want to generate a new Islamic social order via the legalization of sharia in Indonesia.
Their disagreement emerges on the political dimension because PKS supports the democratic system, as indicated by their participation in the general election, while Hizbut Tahrir absolutely rejects the democratic system and avoids democratic politics as a way to raise political power. The possibility of compromise between two politically extreme movements depends on the level of identity i. When they confront common enemies e.
However, open conflict is also likely, even if the groups are similarly extreme on one dimension, when differences on another dimension are salient. A similar pattern may be observed among groups of Muslims who are identified as extreme in ritual dimensions. The Salafy movement and other groups e. That is, when they face moderate Muslims e. However, those ritually extreme groups can conflict with each other when political differences are salient. For example, many Salafy group members perceive that public protest is an illegitimate action according to Islam, while other groups who share their extreme identity on ritual dimension perceive it as legitimate tactic.
The differences along the political dimension can lead them into efforts to dominate each other, and open contests for power. The consequence of similarity and difference in the dimensions of religious extremism is relevant previous work on identity and conflict Haslam et al.
In this model, the salience of subgroup identity e. However, when superordinate identity is salient e. According to this, an approach to religious extremism that focuses solely on one dimension will miss the different ways in which the two groups align e. To apply this model in more practical uses, we need to revisit the reason of this multidimensional model development.
Unidimensional categorization of moderate vs. We propose that extremism is expressed along different dimensions and the mapping of groups and individuals using multiple dimensions in the model will help to understand the patterns of narratives and actions delivered by the groups. This allows for a more nuanced understanding of religious violence whereby we acknowledge that violence can be motivated by different reasons not necessarily related to political causes and that the interplay between different dimensions on which extremism can be expressed can either fuel or restrict religious violence e.
Moving away from over-simplified representations of religious groups as politically motivated, the presented framework offers a practical method to understand the multi-faceted nature of extremism. It aims to analyze religion at both a group and individual level, augmenting scholarly understanding of the religious dimensions that may be relevant to enable accurate predictions of violent extremism based on ideological narratives Kruglanski et al.
Even though the four dimensions of religious extremism that we present here are informed by prior research on extremism and religiosity, the model that we developed is tailored to the context of Indonesian Muslims and their religious movements. When adopting this model in different or wider contexts e. Practically speaking, when adopting the model in other contexts, researchers need to engage in qualitative exploration of the dimensions religious groups use to express their religiosity.
For every dimension found in a particular context, the researchers should then explore what the indicators are of extremism compared to moderate beliefs. Rich descriptive information about the context and specific intra- or intergroup processes need to be considered to enable a multidimensional model tailored and adapted to specific contexts.
In this, some dimensions e. Such an exploration may well lead to the conclusion that the political dimension is the most important dimension to explain violent behavior and that the other three proposed dimensions e. Violent actions against Rohingya Muslims in by Rakhine Buddhist were justified as mere crackdowns against suspected Rohingya insurgents, suggesting that the political dimension may be most important to understand extremism in this context.
However, in other contexts, other dimensions appear to have triggered violence. Specifically, the attack was motivated by a strong consensually shared belief among cult members that violence of this form would wash away their sins and this would allow them as a group to survive the imminent Armageddon.
What these examples also make clear is that the content of the different dimensions and the way that moderate vs. Specifically, while it is important to understand political violence among Indonesian Muslims in terms of views on sharia laws, in the Myanmar context, political extremism centers on views against minorities and their rights. Or, while theological extremism in Indonesia is concerned with the view of God and ritual extremism relates to tolerance for deviating from generally accepted normative ways of enacting religion, for Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, extremism on these dimensions is related to narratives and beliefs around Doomsday.
Finally, when applying the model in other contexts, it is important to consider new dimensions that may be important in understanding extremism. For example, Smart identifies seven dimensions of Buddhist religiosity, including novel dimensions such as the mythological and the experiential. Scholars would discover if these dimensions or others are relevant to differences between moderates and extremists for example, if Buddhist groups who are more mystical are less likely to be extremist through exploratory research and pilot testing.
We, of course, support the prevention of violent extremism, but we also support the notion that being extreme in religious beliefs is not always linked to support for employing violent tactics Austin, Motivating people to participate in violent intergroup conflict, strong narratives about injustice and expected changes may be involved Moghaddam, ; Horgan, However, in many contexts i.
By capturing how extremism is manifested across particular dimensions and how these dimensions predict support for violence, policy-makers can be more focused in countering the religious narratives that might be employed as the catalyst of violence and which are not relevant to address or even counter-productive. This paper highlights that religious extremism is not a unified and ubiquitous phenomenon; rather, religious extremists differ on a number of dimensions in how they express their religion, and consequently, how they aim to achieve important group goals.
For example, even though Salafi movements in Indonesia perceive politics as morally corrupt Chozin, ; Parveez, , they nevertheless tend to avoid a political debate, and obey the rules of the existing government insofar as the government does not prohibit their religious rituals Haron and Hussin, ; Parveez, In a similar vein, the group Hizb al-tahrir is extreme in its stance on the political dimension, as it aims to revive the Islamic empire by overthrowing the concept of the nation state e.
The group believes that jihad means a holy war, but not as the way to establish the Caliphate, but to conquer other nations after the Caliphate is established Azman, In addition, this group was actively involved in protests to reject the cultures and norms of other groups in Indonesia on behalf of Muslim as majority e. We might argue that Hizbut Tahrir is not only extreme in its political dimension, but also theological and social dimensions. Nevertheless, this group seems to be moderate in the ritual dimension.
For instance, a Pew Research Center survey of Muslims in 39 countries asked Muslims whether they want sharia law, a legal code based on the Quran and other Islamic scripture, to be the official law of the land in their country.
Responses on this question vary widely. Relatively small shares say they see ISIS favorably. The Nigerian militant group Boko Haram, which has been conducting a terrorist campaign in the country for years, has sworn allegiance to ISIS. In many cases, people in countries with large Muslim populations are as concerned as Western nations about the threat of Islamic extremism, and have become increasingly concerned in recent years.
Our survey of U. Muslims finds that Muslims in the United States perceive a lot of discrimination against their religious group. Moreover, a solid majority of U. Muslims are leery of President Donald Trump and think their fellow Americans do not see Islam as part of mainstream U. At the same time, however, Muslim Americans overwhelmingly say they are proud to be Americans, believe that hard work generally brings success in this country and are satisfied with the way things are going in their own lives.
Half of Muslim Americans say it has become harder to be Muslim in the U. Living in a religiously pluralistic society, Muslim Americans are more likely than Muslims in many other largely Muslim-majority nations to have a lot of non-Muslim friends. Roughly two-thirds of U. By some of these traditional measures, Muslims in the U. Christians, although they are less religious than Muslims in many other nations. And about half of U.
Sunnis and Shiites are two subgroups of Muslims, just as Catholics and Protestants are two subgroups within Christianity. The Sunni-Shiite divide is nearly 1, years old, dating back to a dispute over the succession of leadership in the Muslim community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in While the two groups agree on some core tenets of Islam, there are differences in beliefs and practices , and in some cases Sunnis do not consider Shiites to be Muslims.
With the exception of a few countries, including Iran which is majority Shiite as well as Iraq and Lebanon which are split , most nations with a large number of Muslims have more Sunnis than Shiites. Amal worried a great deal about their futures in France, since anti-veiling legislation had constrained their opportunities. She also quietly worried about the future of Islam, believing it is under siege both by governments and by the ungodly and destructive work of the Islamic State.
As anthropologists of religion have shown, Salafi women are not passive adherents. Nor are they forced into strict practices by their husbands. Among the French Salafist women I knew, most were the daughters and granddaughters of immigrants from the former French North African colonies.
Almost a third were converts to Islam that chose specifically the Salafist tradition as opposed to mainstream currents of Islam. They were drawn to the clear expectations, rigorous routines and teachings about trusting God. While some of the women were raised in religious families, many broke away from their Muslim families or earned the wrath of their parents for turning to Salafism.
Because the parents practiced a cultural form of Islam, or did not practice at all, they did not want their daughters to wear the jilbab. Despite this disapproval, the women focused a great deal on what it meant to have faith in God, and they emphasized that they had to continually struggle to strengthen that faith.
Some even doubted their faith , which they considered normal and acceptable. In my research, non-Muslims as well as other Muslims claimed Salafists were judgmental of those who did not believe or practice like them. However, like any movement or tradition, Salafism is profoundly diverse and encompasses a number of debates and struggles for legitimacy. So, there are those self-identified Salafists around the world who join political organizations or participate in political debates.
These include, for example, several political parties in Egypt and the Ahl-i-Hadees in India. A small minority, estimated to be , in number by security experts , rejects nation-states and embraces political violence. They span continents but are centered in Iraq and Syria. It shows that the START database counts a total of 70, terrorist incidents between and the end of More broadly, even if Afghanistan is added to the total for Iraq and Syria, the three major countries where the U.
Defeating today's key perpetrators is critical, but it in no way will defeat the longer term threat. The second section of the report draws on a range of polls to put these statistics on incidents into perspective.
There is no poll of opinion in every Muslim or Arab state, and many of the polls available—including the ones in this report—have serious flaws and limitations. Nevertheless, the polling data still seem good enough—and consistent enough—to show that the vast majority of Muslims do not support extremist violence, and that their primary concerns are jobs, the quality of governance, security, and the same practical values shared by non-Muslims.
Moreover, for all the talk of "foreign fighters," even the high estimates in the media represent a negligible portion of the total number of young men who might join in such movements. Arab youth do not support extremist violence. Moreover, the small portion that does in given countries in given polls is often reacting to a crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations or some other major incident, and that limited support tends to drop sharply when it no longer is driven by the heat of the moment.
At the same time, it warns that the rejection of extremism and terrorism does not there was popular support for many U. Casualties in the U. No one can condone or ignore the numbers killed in the U. For example, there were deaths in Europe and all of the Americas between January 1, and July 16, There were 28,—or 43 times more deaths—in other regions—most of them consisting of largely Islamic countries. Almost all of the human impact of extremist attacks is Muslims killing or injuring fellow Muslims.
Seven of the ten countries with the most terrorist attacks in had vast Muslim majorities, and the death and injuries in the other three involve large numbers of Muslim deaths. The vast majority of suicide and vehicle attacks came from "Islamist" extremist groups that killed Muslims in largely Muslim countries.
The fifth section makes it clear that most governments in largely Muslim states are actively moving to suppress religious extremism in their country. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism and Treasury Department lists of designated groups and individuals funding terrorism show both major progress in largely Muslim states in fighting extremism and limiting the funding and support of extremist groups and that much more needs to be done. At the same time, work by the Pew Trust highlights the fact that many largely Muslim states have placed growing limits on extremist preaching and religious activity.
This necessarily interferes with freedom of religion and speech, and given states often exert excessive limits and control, but vague charges that such governments are failing to act do not reflect the real-world actions of many—if not most—governments in largely Muslim states. The sixth section provides a short case state in the dangers of Islamophobia.
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